Authors: Sachin Nandha & Pravar Petkar
Foreword
Vichaar Manthan UK (VM) is a respected platform for public discourse, dedicated to examining the challenges faced by British society through a Hindu civilisational lens. With a decade-long history of fostering intellectual discourse across the UK, VM is a leading force in promoting thoughtful and informed discussions. It is dedicated to nurturing understanding, celebrating diversity and fostering dialogue.
This explainer, titled ‘Understanding Hindutva in the UK’, serves as a vital resource for policymakers, media professionals and community leaders seeking to understand the nuances of Hindutva in the UK, dispelling prevalent misconceptions about this phenomenon. This is a revised second edition of a piece originally published in 2023.
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Introduction
Worldwide interest in the concept of Hindutva has been growing over several years, especially since 2014 when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in India on a platform explicitly seeking to promote India’s Hindu culture and heritage. Global commentary has included an online conference in 2021 hosted by USA-based universities, and in the UK, a range of media commentary in the wake of civil unrest in Leicester in 2022 involving Hindu and Muslim youths. This sustained interest calls for an articulation of what Hindutva is, how it manifests in the UK, and its implications for social cohesion and British society more generally. This explainer demonstrates that on a full understanding of Hindutva and the context of its emergence, Hindutva in the UK must be distinguished from ‘political nationalism’, of which the ideology known as ‘Hindu nationalism’ is thought to be an example. Hindutva instead refers to an expression of Hindu cultural values in both public and private spaces that is consistent with a cohesive and plural British society.
1. Conceptual History
The term ‘Hindutva’ was popularised in twentieth-century India under British rule, by the Indian political leader Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. Savarkar stated “Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole Being [sic] of our Hindu race.” In his view, a full understanding of Hindutva required an answer to the question ‘what is a Hindu?’. Savarkar adopted a definition of ‘Hindu’ based on ancestral and territorial criteria: anyone living in British India who could trace their ancestry back to that region would be considered a ‘Hindu’. His basis for this was the etymology of the term ‘Hindu’: as the Persian empire had expanded eastwards, it had come into contact with the successors of the Indus Valley Civilisation, which had centred around the river ‘Sindhu’ (Indus). In Persian, the word ‘Sindhu’ was rendered as ‘Hindu’, providing one account of the name given to this group people and their customs and culture. This ancestral and territorial framing led Savarkar to the view that “Hinduism is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva”. Hindutva, for Savarkar, therefore, was not a religious phenomenon. Nevertheless, he posits the notion of a common culture that unites all Hindus stemming from this root civilisation, where self-identification with that culture is critical to being called ‘Hindu’ alongside a common ancestry and a common land for which he claimed all Hindus should have a deep reverence.
Savarkar’s account must be understood by reference to its historical and political purpose: to craft a collective Hindu identity to produce the unity necessary to campaign for India’s independence as a nation-state. This form of nationalism can be viewed, from a postcolonial lens, as a variant of one of the nationalist claims required for India to throw off British rule; Savarkar was in fact competing with the ideas of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who advocated for a separate Pakistan on the basis that Hindus and Muslims could not form part of the same political unit, and Mahatma Gandhi, who envisioned a liberal alliance between Hindus and Muslims, and gave support to the khilafat movement for Islamic unity following the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
At the time at which Savarkar conceptualised Hindutva in this way, Hindu migration outside India was rare and associated with a loss of identity. Since the 1940s however, there have been several waves of Hindu migration outside India, initially to East Africa, and later to the UK, the USA and Canada. Cultural practices with Hindu roots, such as yoga and meditation, have become popular across the world, including in the UK. Individuals without an Indian ancestral background in the UK now identify with a Hindu identity. Savarkar’s definition of Hindutva therefore no longer reflects the lived reality of the Hindu community as confined by territory or ancestry. This suggests that a fresh conceptualisation of Hindutva which takes into account this lived reality is required.
The term ‘Hindutva’ and the ideas of common culture associated with Savarkar’s definition have also been referenced by the Supreme Court of India. In a judgment handed down in 1984, the Chief Justice of India, PN Bhagwati, stated: “India was formed into a nation neither on account of a common language nor on account of a single political regime over its territories; but on account of a common culture evolved over centuries.” In 1995, the Court also characterised Hindutva as a ‘way of life’ and not a ‘way of worship’, and so not confined to religion. In the specific case before it, it held that it was an error of law “that the use of the word Hindutva or Hinduism per se depicts an attitude hostile to all persons practising any religion other than Hindu religion”.
A central feature of the academic treatment of Hindutva is its use as a synonym for the political ideology known as ‘Hindu nationalism’. These academic accounts typically refer to Hindutva as a political ideology based on Hindu majoritarianism. They draw an association between Hindutva and the BJP, which casts itself as a ‘nationalist’ movement. According to Jaffrelot, Hindu nationalism is an ethnonationalist ideology based on the assertion of a common religion, a common land (territory), a common race, and a common language (Hindi) as the pillars of Hindu, and therefore Indian identity. Jaffrelot adds that Savarkar’s 1921 definition of Hindutva “codified” the ideology of Hindu nationalism. Hence, the conventional academic understanding of Hindutva is as an ethnonationalist and anti-plural political ideology. Jaffrelot connects the rise of ‘Hindu nationalism’ to the growing dominance of the BJP in Indian politics. This dominance is traced back to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a grassroots movement started in Nagpur in 1925 to strengthen the majority Hindu community of British India. Organisations affiliated with the RSS or BJP are those usually branded as ‘Hindu nationalist’ for this reason. However, if Savarkar is no longer an appropriate starting point for understanding Hindu identity in the UK today, then his definition of Hindutva, and its association with ‘Hindu nationalism’ may not reflect its reality in contemporary British society. An alternative starting point, therefore, is the linguistic definition of Hindutva, discussed below.
2. Linguistic Definition
The term ‘Hindutva’ comes from Sanskrit. Etymologically, it is made up of the word ‘Hindu’ and the suffix ‘-tva’. The term ‘Hindu’, which typically references a faith group, should not be thought of as a closed set whose members all subscribe to the same set of doctrines concerning matters such as divinity and social conduct. These characteristics are typically associated with religious identity. Instead, its scope is wider. It encompasses those who engage in the cultural practices that are rooted in the territory now represented by the modern nation-states of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. A ‘Hindu’ can range from those born and directly brought up in these traditions, to those who draw inspiration from Hindu literature, and even yoga practitioners and environmentalists who trace their values, beliefs and practices to Hindu metaphysics or moral values (often known as Hindu ‘dharma’) and self-identify as Hindu. The Hindu identity, thus understood, is largely a ‘cultural’ one rather than a ‘religious’ one, though there are religions within the Hindu canopy.
The suffix ‘-tva’ means ‘the essence of’. Accordingly, ‘Hindutva’ is literally ‘the essence of being Hindu’, or ‘Hindu-ness’. In practice, Hindutva is the expression of one’s Hindu identity and values as it applies to their own life. This can range from engagement in cultural practices, including the celebration of festivals, the performance of indigenous dance or music, or the wearing of culturally significant clothing or accessories, to the promotion and propagation of the values associated with Hindu culture within one’s society and daily life. These examples, and the linguistic roots of the concept, suggest that Hindutva encompasses the expression of Hindu identity in both the public and private spheres.
3. Hindutva is Not ‘Political Nationalism’
The linguistic definition of Hindutva suggests that is a broad concept relating to the expression of Hindu identity. It should therefore be distinguished from the ideas of ‘nationalism’ with which it is frequently associated in academic discourse. The account of ‘Hindu nationalism’ put forward by Jaffrelot specifically concerns the phenomenon termed ‘official nationalism’ or ‘political nationalism’. Both terms refer to attempts to use the apparatus of the state to build the ‘imagined community’ of the ‘nation’. The former term, referenced by Benedict Anderson, refers to ways in which the power of the colonial state was used to propagate and realise Western nationalisms and the supremacy of colonial powers. According to John Hutchinson, ‘political nationalism’ takes the state as “representative of the nation which will break with tradition”, subordinating all other group identities to that of the state to achieve political autonomy. Political nationalisms thus treat the nation as co-existent and coterminous with the nation-state, envisaging that the development of the state and formation of national identity in new ‘nation-states’ will follow the pattern of nation-state formation in eighteenth-century Europe. This pattern takes as a key historical prior the transition from a society linked primarily by religion to one constructed along common language and the sense of a shared public space constructed through print capitalism.
It is not obvious that when understood as a term standing for the expression of Hindu identity, Hindutva is a form of ‘political nationalism’. Crucial to ‘political nationalism’ is the involvement of the state in nation-building. Yet Hindu identity can be expressed independently of the state, through the celebration of festivals, the promotion of culturally rooted art or music, or the promotion of practices associated with Hindu values such as vegetarianism or environmentalism. Even where state officials are engaged in expressing Hindu identity in official premises, that expression must be distinguished from a ‘political nationalism’. For example, former UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak lit sacred lamps outside 11 Downing Street when Chancellor, and outside 10 Downing Street as Prime Minister. As Sunak himself publicly stated following the first of these instances, this was simply someone celebrating his own personal cultural and religious traditions. Neither the British state, nor the Indian state is, in this example, involved in nation-building of any kind.
If Hindutva can be associated with any kind of ‘nationalism’, it is the phenomenon which Hutchinson refers to as ‘cultural nationalism’. Cultural nationalism is an “integrative force” that seeks to unite warring groups by drawing upon a ‘golden age’ of history to revive a sense of a common history and culture as part of a modernising initiative. Though cultural nationalism draws on practices such as music, poetry and art which go towards constructing an ‘imagined community’, it does not follow that all such cultural expressions have this nation-building purpose; many, as in the example given above, are for entirely private reasons. At best, therefore, ‘cultural nationalism’ is an element of Hindutva, rather than a blanket term that describes it.
The conflation of ‘Hindutva’ and the ideology known as ‘Hindu nationalism’ in accounts such as Jaffrelot’s should therefore be resisted, on the grounds that ‘Hindutva’ is a distinct type of phenomenon, and not necessarily a ‘nationalism’ of any kind. Accordingly, the expression of Hindu identity should not, without further evidence, be taken as support for specific political ideologies or political parties that are thought to advance them. This does not discount the existence of a ‘Hindu nationalism’, nor does it rule out the possibility that Hindu political movements may use state apparatus in India or other countries to propagate the anti-plural views which Jaffrelot and Edward Anderson associate with their account of ‘Hindutva’ as ‘Hindu nationalism’. Further research is required to understand whether movements or ideologies labelled as ‘Hindu nationalist’ fit the model of ‘political nationalism’ highlighted above, as well as whether there are organisations in the UK that promote such views. More detailed evidence than examples of the expression of Hindu identity are necessary to establish this.
4. Examples of Hindutva in the UK
When Hindutva is defined as ‘Hindu-ness’, the scope of Hindutva in the UK is a function of how the UK’s Hindu community expresses its own identity and values. The academic conflation of Hindutva and ‘Hindu nationalism’ discussed above opens the door for benign expressions of Hindu identity in British society to be branded as ‘ethno-nationalist’, chauvinist or anti-plural. The examples presented in this section will highlight how this conflation can stigmatise Hindus in the UK and disincentivizes their cultural expression. This reinforces the need for policymakers and state authorities to treat ‘Hindutva’ as a solely cultural phenomenon.
Example 1: Hanuman Flag in Leicester, 2023
In August 2023, videos were recorded of Hindus in Leicester celebrating the festival of Janmashtami, commemorating the birth of Hindu deity Krishna, in which a flag of Hanuman, another deity, was being waved. This was erroneously identified as a Bajrang Dal flag, and branded as “far right”, “Hindu nationalist”, “islamophobic” [sic], “fascist” and “militant” in a series of social media posts by Majid Freeman, who raised concerns with the police. The organisers of the celebrations later released a statement that the flag was displayed for purely ‘religious’ purposes. This incident is one that could rightly be described as ‘Hindutva’ on the definition set out here, since the individuals waving the flag were displaying a Hindu cultural symbol outwardly. Nevertheless, if ‘Hindu nationalism’ is viewed as an ethno-nationalist and chauvinist ideology, the equation of this cultural expression with ‘Hindu nationalism’ is a “very serious accusation”. It implies that the display of Hindu symbols is anti-plural, and so a threat to social and community cohesion in the UK, without evidence that those holding the flag showed any such beliefs. This leads to the conclusion that Hindus ought to be prevented from displaying cultural symbols and expressing their identity in this way, irrespective of their freedom to practise religion as protected under Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Example 2: Damage to Hindu Temples, 1990s
In the early 1990s, several Hindu temples and Hindu-owned businesses were either robbed and/or suffered criminal damage or arson, with the total damage claimed to be £4 million. Shops belonging to Hindu community leaders were attacked and death threats were issued to the leaders in question. These events occurred in reaction to members of the Vishva Hindu Parishad demolishing the Babri Masjid structure in Ayodhya, India, following a campaign by the BJP. This shows how the conflation of Hindutva in the UK and organisations associated with ‘Hindu nationalism’ led to serious and damaging attacks on the person and property of British Hindus going about their everyday business. Attacks such as these induce fear within communities and prevent Hindus from lawfully exercising their cultural freedoms.
Example 3: Processions for Hindu festivals, 2023
A procession that took place in Leicester for the Ganesh Chaturthi festival has been described as one carried out by ‘Hindu supremacists’. Neither the association of the procession with a Hindu festival, nor its nature as a procession are sufficient to establish that it is ‘Hindu supremacist’, a charge often associated with ‘Hindu nationalism’. As such a procession engages both the freedom to practise one’s religion or culture and the freedom of assembly (protected under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights), the only legitimate reasons for the authorities to interfere with it is that it falls foul of the restrictions built within those protections, including that it must be held according to law and not disproportionately interfere with the rights of others. This further highlights how charges such as ‘Hindu supremacism’ may deter Hindus from lawfully expressing their cultural identity.
Example 4: Raksha Bandhan celebrations in the UK
Hindus in the UK also hold public celebrations for festivals such as Raksha Bandhan. This festival typically celebrates sibling and other close relationships, but in its public setting, extends to appreciating the work that public servants, including members of the Armed Forces, the police and the fire services do in service to British society. Such celebrations have taken place in several cities and have been initiated by several types of Hindu organisations, including temples and professional networks. This propagation of the Hindu value of selfless service (which Hindus term sewa) into the community in this manner is an expression of Hindu identity with no apparent attempts to use the state apparatus to engage in political nation-building.
Example 5: Hindu advocacy
The scope of Hindutva in the UK might also extend to Hindu advocacy. Relevant challenges faced by Hindus in the UK include the removal of religious context from Hindu festivals such as Diwali, the cultural appropriation of yoga (which has its roots in Hindu practices), anti-Hindu sentiment and the quality of current Hindu education in schools. If members of the Hindu community or Hindu groups were to call for legal or regulatory changes to address these issues, it would amount to a clear assertion of Hindu identity in the British public space. This would be another example of Hindutva, when understood as an expression of cultural identity.
Such examples of coalition-building and campaigning by Hindu groups would, however, be branded as ‘neo-Hindutva’, and therefore ‘Hindu nationalist’ in current academic discourse. The notion of ‘neo-Hindutva’, developed by Edward Anderson, suggests that ‘Hindutva’ (understood as ‘Hindu nationalism’) exists beyond organisations affiliated to the RSS and BJP, and is expressed through the claims of Hindu representative groups in multicultural settings. This definition is a problematic one, as it would capture almost every instance of collective Hindu campaigning or advocacy in the UK, with the implication that this should be restricted both because of its moral associations and on the grounds of its apparent links to formal political actors. This could lead to all avenues for legitimate Hindu advocacy being closed down on account of a mistaken conflation between Hindutva and ideas of ‘political nationalism’. Such associations should not be drawn in the absence of clear evidence to this effect.
5. Hindutva, Hindu Values and British Society
Hindutva, on the definition set out here, extends to the propagation of Hindu values in any society in which Hindus have chosen to live. It has been suggested that diaspora Hindus, including those in the UK, typically have more progressive values than those in India. However, discussion that conflates Hindutva with ‘Hindu nationalism’ associates the expression of Hindu identity with political violence, heritage-based discrimination and the intolerance of other religions, including Islam and Christianity. Hindutva in the UK is more accurately associated with a broadly liberal set of values, as indicated below.
Values subscribed to by Hindus in the UK include liberty and a respect for freedom of speech and freedom of thought, rationality and an emphasis on reason, sustainability (which is in some circles equated to the concept of dharma) and a compassion for all living beings, which drives some Hindus to support various environmental initiatives. In respect of freedom of thought, it should be noted that Hindu culture is a broad field, containing a range of different religious and non-religious worldviews which are all appreciated as manifestations of an underlying core. Common Hindu maxims include vasudhaiva kutumbakam, a humanist statement literally translating to ‘the world is one family’ and sarve bhavantu sukhinah, meaning ‘let all be happy’. This points to an open and plural ethos encouraging the flourishing of all in society.
Philosophically, the Hindu moral outlook is grounded on the idea that all living beings – both human and more-than-human – are manifestations of the same underlying consciousness. On this basis, any discrimination based on material factors, such as birth-based identity, race, professional status, gender or sexuality runs contrary to Hindu values. This is because material factors are presented in Hindu philosophy as superficial differences masking an underlying equality and unity. Hindutva, as the expression of these Hindu principles, rejects common forms of discrimination such as those based on gender (including transphobia) and phobia or hatred directed towards LGBTQIA+ individuals and groups. It also rejects discrimination between religious groups in favour of a pluralism that accommodates other traditions so long as they do not pose a threat to social harmony. Whilst ‘Hindu nationalism’ has been associated with anti-Muslim sentiment, further evidence of attitudes towards Muslims amongst British Hindus would be needed to establish a link between these two phenomena.
Hindutva, understood in this way, also reflects the Hindu philosophical view of the importance of women’s rights. For Hindus, the feminine divine is given equal, if not greater importance than the masculine form. The twice-yearly festival of Navratri is a celebration of the divine feminine and its various aspects and qualities. It suggests that spiritual self-realisation on the Hindu view is achieved through the combination of classically feminine and masculine traits.
Several, often contradictory, links have been drawn between ‘Hindu nationalism’, Hindu philosophy and caste-based discrimination. Common accounts of ‘Hindu nationalism’ paint it as an upper-caste movement on the basis of the caste status of Savarkar and some of the initial leaders of the RSS, although Savarkar himself engaged in anti-caste activism, and caste hierarchy has been denounced by RSS leaders. Jaffrelot, for example, suggests that caste is inseparable from Hindu traditions, yet claims that diaspora Hindus do not subscribe to caste discrimination, whilst others suggest that it is not intrinsic to Hindu teachings. Research by the Government Equalities Office has noted that views on the extent of caste discrimination in the UK (which is treated as a phenomenon that is not religion-specific) “vary extensively”. It is difficult to claim with any certainty, as a result, that the expression of Hindu identity in the UK is likely to introduce caste-based discrimination into British society. Moreover, Hindu philosophical views of spiritual equality in fact provide grounds for internally criticising any caste discrimination or hierarchy and advocating for greater egalitarianism.
There is little therefore to suggest that Hindutva, understood as the expression of Hindu values, should be considered a threat to British values or to social cohesion in the UK. Although there is no definitive statement of British values, examples include “a belief in freedom, tolerance of others, accepting personal and social responsibility, [and] respecting and upholding the rule of law”. Several of these values in fact parallel those associated with Hindu philosophy above. With respect to the rule of law, for example, Ministry of Justice statistics identify only 333 Hindu prisoners (c.0% of the prison population) in England and Wales as of June 2023, whilst Scottish prisons data from 2013-14 suggests that the proportion of Hindus amongst the Scottish prison population is considerably lower than their proportion amongst the general population at the time. There have nevertheless been incidents where community cohesion between British Hindus and other groups has broken down, including the Hindu-Muslim civil unrest in Leicester in 2022. It has been argued that this was a localised matter, and it is suggested here, on this basis, that it does not necessarily reflect Hindu attitudes towards other communities in the UK in general.
Conclusion
Hindutva is the essence of being Hindu, or ‘Hindu-ness’. Hindutva in the UK stands for the expression of Hindu identity, which includes the display of Hindu symbols, the public celebration of Hindu festivals, the promotion of Hindu values and collective community efforts at Hindu advocacy. Hindutva in the UK is not a form of ‘political nationalism’. Conflating it with what is termed ‘Hindu nationalism’ risks stigmatising Hindus and disincentivising the legitimate expression of their values. Instead, Hindutva in the UK is complementary to core British values of freedom of thought, liberty, compassion and equality.
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